Abstract. Micro-econometric intra-cohort profitability analyses of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension contributions are rare. We use representative employment histories of a birth cohort of German PAYG pension insurants retiring in year 2005 to econometrically examine the determinants of the profitability of such contributions using nominal internal rates of return (IRR) as profitability measure. When future nominal pension entitlements are frozen at today's level, average IRR is slightly above three percent. At the same time, IRR differs substantially across beneficiaries. IRR is increasing in beneficiaries' remaining life expectancies at retirement and in the length of non-contribution periods resulting, for example, from child care or care for an ill partner. Due to survivor pensions, married insurants benefit from higher IRR as compared to the non-married. Interestingly, IRR is decreasing in insurants' earnings capacity, indicating that the system entails an intra-cohort progressive element.
Introduction
As shown by Samuelson (1958) , in a two-age groups overlapping generations model (OLG) with an infinite time horizon, an exogenous production sector and a constant contribution rate, the steady-state rate of return on contributions in a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system is equal to the rate of growth in the labor force and in productivity. Hence, in countries experiencing population ageing, low fertility and low productivity growth, pre-funded pension systems with privately defined contribution plans may appear a superior alternative. Indeed, the two most propagated arguments in favor of privately defined contribution plans are that such plans raise national savings and thus stimulate growth, and that returns on contributions are higher than in PAYG systems (e.g., Palacios and Whitehouse, 1998) . 1 Models that quantitatively investigate rates of return on pension contributions almost exclusively focus on the inter-generational dimension. Recent literatures include Settergren and Mikula (2005) and Knell (2010) . Only a few studies address the intra-cohort dimension (i.e., Cubeddu, 2000, Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987 , Imrohoroglu et al., 1995 , and Fullerton and Rogers, 1993 . This is surprising as the intra-cohort dimension is of key relevance for policymakers: PAYG pension schemes approach maturity worldwide and the intra-cohort distribution of rates of return can be seen as an indicator of life-time redistribution within the pension system. Particularly, the intra-cohort dimension reveals how well, in monetary terms, an insurant is treated relative to other insurants in her cohort, and how well-off the birth cohort as a whole is (e.g., Liebman, 2001, pp. 5-6) .
In many countries neither experts nor the public know how intra-cohort distributions of rates of return on pension contributions look like, largely because the necessary micro data, i.e.
insurances' biographies together with their pension entitlements, is not available. Instead, rates of return on pension contributions are typically computed for some types of "representative" insurants with stylized biographies. Yet, such representative beneficiaries are rarely an efficient simplification, and the exception rather than the rule: Even within the same birth cohort, labor-market shocks, human capital investments, marriage and fertility decisions, and other factors cause substantial heterogeneity in individuals' employment biographies. All these factors affect individual pension contributions and entitlements, and this may map in 1 Of course, the rate of return is only one evaluation criterion. Potentially favorable effects of PAYG systems include the elimination of adverse selection (Townley and Boadway, 1988; Feldstein, 1990 ) and the avoidance of free riding by parents at the expense of their altruistic children (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988) . They can also serve as a device for intergenerational risk sharing (e.g., Smith, 1982, and Gordon and Varian, 1988) , and as an insurance against not having children (Sinn, 2004) . Moreover, they may act as an enforcement device for ungrateful children (Sinn, 2004). differences in rates of return across insurants.
2 Furthermore, computations based on representative beneficiary types do not shed light on the intra-cohort redistributive channels inherent in pension systems, coming from the fact that pension entitlements depend on various factors other than earnings. For example, in the German system as in many others, pension entitlements of married insurants can be transferred to the partner after the insurant's death; insurants with children benefit from regulations that compensate for income losses during periods of child rising.
For such and other reasons, Bosworth et al. (1999) argue that stylized hypothetical earnings biographies assuming steady earnings throughout earnings careers are misleading, and argue that researchers should consider real-life earnings patterns that can be seen in micro data. The present work seeks to contribute in this direction by providing the intra-cohort distribution of internal rates of return (IRR) on pension contributions in Germany's PAYG system, the blueprint of Bismarck-type pension systems worldwide.
In our analysis, we focus on old-age pensioners with West German employment biographies retiring in year 2005. These insurants realized an average expected nominal IRR of about 3.3 percent. At the same time, IRR substantially differs across different beneficiary groups. In particular, IRR is significantly influenced by the beneficiaries' gender: it is about one percentage point higher for female compared with male beneficiaries. The IRR gender divide results from the fact that the German PAYG system credits periods of child rising or care for ill/handicapped partners and that female insurants undertake these activities more often.
Another important finding is that the IRR is decreasing in insurants' lifetime earnings, suggesting that the German system entails an intra-cohort lifetime progressive element.
The IRR distribution is derived from authentic representative social security records from a recently released database, the "Completed Insurant Lives" 3 (CIB) provided to us by the German Pension Insurance. For a representative sample of pension insurants retiring in year 2005, the CIB contains monthly-level information on insurants' employment biographies.
Particularly, the database documents, for each insurant, the entire stream of pension contributions before retirement together with actual annual pension entitlements at the moment of retirement. Unfortunately, the CIB does not include insurants who did not survive until retirement. Accordingly, our IRR estimates are conditional upon survival. Due to a positive risk of pre-retirement death, unconditional IRR estimates should be lower. In sum, our approach takes a forward-looking perspective on retirement and a backward-looking perspective on employment.
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Empirical studies on the intra-cohort IRR distribution, such as ours, are scarce due to the lack of adequate data. Only a handful of studies exist, including Burkhauser and Warlick (1981) , Hurd and Shoven (1985) , Duggan et al. (1993) , Gustman and Steinmeier (1999), and Liebman (2001) . To the best of our knowledge, previous studies for Germany exclusively focused on stylized biographies (e.g., Schnabel and Ottnad, 2008 , Ohsmann and Stolz, 2004 , or Schnabel, 1998 .
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the database and its preparation. Section 3 contains the technical framework. The sample breakdown is presented in Section 4, and Section 5 provides our empirical results. Section 6 deals with the implications of our results, and Section 7 concludes.
Database and data preparation 2.1 Completed Insurant Lives 2005
The We have discarded several biographies from the database for reasons listed below:
(1) Sometimes biographical information is fragmented and incomplete. This can happen if the pension entitlement of a beneficiary has been computed manually by an employee of the German pension insurance (see German Pension Insurance, 2007, p. 15, for details). This affects 2,222 cases which have been discarded from the database. 4 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their most helpful comments concerning the impact of the sample restrictions on our (conditional) IRR estimates.
(2) As our focus is on old-age pensioners (according to Social Security Code (SSC), 
Survival probabilities
To assess the expected value of pension entitlements, insurants' survival probabilities are required. Survival probabilities are derived from official gender-and age-specific mortality In case of an insurant's death, the surviving partner can receive a survivor pension which constitutes a further return component on the insurant's contributions. To derive the expected value of survivor pensions, we have also computed the probability that an insurant deceases in a specific year after retirement while the partner is still alive (and hence is credited a survivor pension). Resulting joint probabilities are summarized in Figure 2 . Again, graphs are decomposed by retirement age and gender. The joint probabilities rely on the assumption that the partner of a male (female) insurant is three years younger (older). Higher survival probabilities of females together with the age difference between the partners lead to a substantial gap in the joint probabilities for female and male insurants. Mortality tables provided by the German Federal Statistical Office do not differentiate with respect to income. However, several studies suggest that people with higher incomes tend to live longer (e.g., Rogot et al., 1992, and Pappas et al., 1993) . This affects the IRR distribution:
our approach tends to underestimate IRR of insurants with high income. We will come back to this issue in Section 5.2. Official mortality statistics also do not reveal the interdependencies in the remaining lifetimes of spouses. According to Luciano et al. (2008) , when one of the spouses dies, the partner's probability of dying rises. Then our IRR estimates for married insurants are too high as expected returns from widow(er) pensions are overvalued.
Finally, the possibility of future improvements in life expectancy is not taken into account, potentially leading to downward-biased IRR estimates. The German pension system is stabilized via substantial tax-financed state subsidies. Noninsurance-related benefits such as transfers to the new federal states, to families, immigrants and minimum pensions, which are not entirely covered by own contributions, are the rationale for these subsidies. The rise in VAT rates in April 1998 was justified by a rising deficit in the public pension system and the political will not to further increase contribution rates. Since year 1990, the share of total PAYG expenses that was covered by state subsidies rose from 18.7 to 27.8 percent (see Figure 3 for details). Our IRR estimates do not reflect that such subsidies are financed by taxes, also imposed on the beneficiaries. Moreover, taxsubsidization may have additional distributional effects. Germany's income-tax tariff, for example, is progressive. Taking such an effect into account would reduce the IRR of "rich" relative to the "poor."
Finally, our IRR estimates are gross. In the German PAYG system, pension contributions are equally financed by the beneficiary and her employer. Eventually, both reduce the beneficiary's net earnings so that we interpret the sum of both as the beneficiary's investment. 9 To be consistent, we consider gross pension entitlements before tax deductions, health care or care insurance contributions when calculating the IRR.
Deriving IRR from the database
This subsection first sketches the legal framework determining pension contributions and entitlements. Then we show how the necessary information can be derived from CIB and complementary external databases and summarize our working assumptions.
Book six of the Social Security Code contains the legal framework of Germany's statutory pay-as-you-go pension system. A central characteristic of the system is a close relation between the sum of earnings liable to compulsory insurance from so-called "contribution periods" and monthly pension entitlement after retirement. However, pension entitlements can also be gained during so-called "non-contribution periods". For example, when a mother withdraws from the labor market after the birth of a child, pension contributions (and corresponding entitlements) are credited for a limited period although she did not make pension contributions from own earnings in the same period. Non-contribution periods can be credited for the following reasons: (i) sickness, rehabilitation, studies or higher education, and others (so-called "Anrechnungszeiten"); (ii) military service or detention due to political reasons (so-called "Ersatzzeiten"); (iii) child-raising or care of dependants
The sum of all the credited pension contributions of a beneficiary j in period t , ,
In equation (2) 
RP =
). Accumulated remuneration points during aforementioned non-contribution period do not reflect an investment. For this reason, they are not included when a beneficiary's investment is computed. However, they are considered when the pension entitlement is defined.
It is possible to distinguish remuneration points from own contributions and from noncontribution periods through combining, month per month, the information contained in the 
Q indicating the joint probability that an insurant with characteristics ( )
a g in year t is dead whereas the married partner is still alive. The level of the survivor pension depends on j 's pension entitlement and several socio-economic characteristics of the partner, captured by the vector k Y : the partner's own pension entitlement, age, health status, etc. Unfortunately, CIB does not provide information on the partner's characteristics. We assume that the surviving partner always receives a "large" widow(er) pension and that the corresponding income equals the mean pension entitlement of a married beneficiary of the same gender.
According to SSC VI, any Euro of a survivor's income exceeding a threshold amount of 26.4
times the current pension level reduces the survivor pension by € 0.40. As "large" widow(er)
pensions are granted if the surviving partner has reached the age of 47 and all insurants in the working sample are of age 60 or older, using "large" widow(er) pensions in the computations should be an appropriate procedure. Gender-specific distributions of remuneration points accumulated over their lifetimes can be taken from Figure 5 . It is transparent that male beneficiaries, on average, accrue more remuneration points and hence are entitled to higher annual pensions than female beneficiaries. As can be taken from Figure 6 , most of the difference can be explained by the fact that male beneficiaries typically have longer contribution periods compared to female
Sample description
beneficiaries. Yet, also the composition of the remuneration points is gender-specific. 16 As outlined above, remuneration points can be gained from own contribution periods but also from non-contribution periods. Table 3 gives the shares of remuneration points accrued during periods when no own contributions were made. On average, about 15 percent of a beneficiary's remuneration points stem from non-contribution periods, and about 85 percent result from own contribution periods. The fraction of remuneration points from noncontribution periods is substantially higher for female beneficiaries (22.226 percent compared to 7.489 percent). Particularly, remuneration points for child raising periods and care for an ill partner are driving this divide.
IRR estimates and the IRR distribution
Section 5 consists of two parts. Section 5.1 provides descriptive statistics of the IRR and its distribution. A regression analysis quantifying the determinants of IRR follows in Section 5.2.
15 Under specific conditions, the pension can already be granted at an age of 60 year. 16 Remuneration points from contribution-free periods (VVL05 variable: byfhep90); remuneration points from periods of reduced contribution (VVL05 variable: bygmep90); additional remuneration points from periods of reduced contributions (VVL05 variable: zbygme90); remuneration points for childcare (VVL05 variable: dvki90); additional remuneration points for childcare and care (zqegki90). investigates these and other relationships in more detail.
Descriptive statistics
Figures 7 and 8 complement the information provided in Table 4 by IRR histograms. In each graph, the horizontal axis gives IRR, and the vertical axis the relative frequency of beneficiaries with a respective IRR level. Figure 7 provides the gender-specific information for the full sample, and Figure 8 provides IRR histograms by type of old-age pension. Black bars always relate to female beneficiaries, grey bars to male beneficiaries. Figure 7 suggests that IRR distributions are highly gender-specific. For male beneficiaries, the distribution looks lognormal with a peak slightly above two percent and a fatter right than left tail. For female beneficiaries, the distribution is about uniformly distributed between 2.0 and 4.5 percent, and it possesses a fatter right tail. Histograms by pension-type in Figure 8 support the impression of systematic gender-specific differences even after controlling for the type of pension. Most pronounced, is the difference in SSC VI §35-related pensions. Here the shape is uniform for female beneficiaries with a peak at an IRR level of about 4.5 percent. For male insurants, the distribution has two peaks, one at an IRR level of about 2.0 percent and another around 4.0 percent. The graph for §237a pension-recipients contains only one histogram. The reason is that only female insurants are credited §237a pensions. The peak of the histogram is at an IRR level of around 2.5 percent.
Regression analysis
The subsequent regression analysis is performed for two purposes. First, it quantifies how insurants' individual characteristics and PAYG system inherent regulations affect IRR.
Second, it sheds light on whether such regulations have similar effects on the IRR of female and male beneficiaries after controlling for individual characteristics. The regression results are provided in Table 5 . Adjusted coefficients of determination suggest that the regression models capture heterogeneity in IRR satisfactorily well. F statistics reject the null-hypothesis that all the regression coefficients (excluding the constant) are zero.
Concerning the composition of remuneration points, remuneration points from childcare and care have a particularly positive impact on IRR. The 2 χ test statistic indicates that the effect is more pronounced for females (at 10 percent significance level). Moreover, such remuneration points are typically accumulated by female beneficiaries, contributing to the gender divide in IRR observed in Section 5.1. For the full sample, the regression coefficient pertaining to the share of additional/credited remuneration points for childcare has no significant effect. For the male sub-sample, it has a strong and negative effect. However, the result should not be overrated: only eight male insurants are credited additional/credited remuneration points, and the share of such remuneration points in the total sum of remuneration points for the eight insurants is quite low (ranging between 0.204 and 0.341 percent). The regression coefficient for the "share of remuneration points from contributionfree periods" exhibits a negative sign for all three samples. The effect of contribution-free periods on IRR is quantitatively stronger for females (at five percent level). Contribution-free periods include periods when no own contributions have been made for reasons not in the responsibility of the insurant (so-called "Ersatzzeiten"). Particularly, such periods include war captivity and prosecution during Nazi dictatorship. Contribution-free periods also encompass none-insured periods due to sickness, maternity or unemployment (so-called "Anrechungszeiten"). IRR decreases in the "share of remuneration points from such contribution-free periods," and the effect is stronger for female insurants. The "share of remuneration points from periods of reduced contributions" rises IRR, at least for male insurants. For female insurants, the effect is insignificant. Periods of reduced contributions are a mixture of own-contribution periods and "Anrechnungszeiten", for example, a month where an insurant is working part-time and simultaneously is enrolled as a student. If, during such 18 The expected life expectancy of the partner after the beneficiary's death and the beneficiary's life expectancy after retirement are highly correlated. The same applies to the difference between official retirement age and the beneficiary's age at retirement. To avoid problems of multi-collinearity, we refrained from including the retiree's life expectancy in the regression.
periods, remuneration points from own contributions fall below a specific threshold, additional remuneration points are granted (see SSC VI, § 71, para. 2). The effect is particularly strong for male insurants. The "share of additional remuneration points from periods of reduced contributions" also has a positive effect on IRR. Again, the effect is more pronounced for male compared to female insurants.
Earnings capacity, measured by j RP ∆ , turns out to be negatively related with IRR: the more contributions from own earnings an insurant has provided over her/his lifetime, the lower is IRR. Interpreting IRR as an indicator of the life-time redistribution, the finding indicates that Germany's pension system is progressive, redistributing in favor of insurants with a lower earnings capacity. The effect is more pronounced for male compared to female insurants. We would like to remind the reader that the survival probabilities underlying our calculations do not differentiate with respect to income. Differential mortality may weaken or even offset the progressive effect.
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Via survivor pensions, the system also redistributes in favor of married insurants. Compared with non-married beneficiaries, average IRR for the married is significantly higher. The longer life expectancy of females in combination with the positive age difference between husbands and spouses explain why the effect is more pronounced for male insurants (regression coefficients of 0.456 for male and 0.126 for female insurants, and a highly significant 2 χ statistic).
Early retiring beneficiaries receive below-average returns reflecting regulations punishing early retirement (for the role of early retirement on returns on pension contributions see also Börsch-Supan, 2000 , and references cited therein). As indicated by an insignificant 2 χ statistic, the impact of such regulations is the same for male and female insurants.
Concerning the set of dummy variables distinguishing retirees by type of pension, full sample estimates indicate no differences in IRR for §35 retirees, our reference group, §36 and §237
retirees. However, recipients of a old-age pensions for handicapped persons (SSC VI, §37) benefit from a slightly higher IRR, while the opposite is true for females receiving a §237a
pension. The latter finding is driven by the fact that female §237a-pension recipients, on average, retire 2.893 years earlier than female insurants falling into another pension category.
Finally, the regression constant is the same for female and male insurants. After controlling for all the right-hand side variables, regressions do not indicate IRR of male and female insurants to be different.
Implications
To Making such a direct comparison of returns is naive for a number of reasons. The PAYG system involves a life-insurance element. In particular, there are two issues concerning the timing of death. First, the capital stock from an investment in treasury notes may be exhausted too early in case the person lives longer than expected. On the contrary, the PAYG system covers the insurant until the random date of death. The second issue about the timing of death is that the insurant might die "too young", even many years before retirement age. Then the PAYG system can serve, via survivor pensions, as insurance for the surviving partner (or children). Such a risk is not insured by an investment in treasury notes. Via pensions for the disabled, the PAYG system also provides insurance in case of reduced earning capacity. Riskaverse insurants may be reluctant to accept a low but stable rate of return on PAYG contributions rather than higher yet more volatile returns on bonds. Another aspect is that it is not ruled out that capital markets are affected by population ageing, too (with some delay).
The asset market meltdown hypothesis predicts that, when the baby boomers retire, they will sell bonds and stocks and this will negatively affect the value of such assets (see Poterba, 2001 ). Then returns on assets in the past are a too optimistic predictor for their future returns.
Also, the recent turbulence in financial markets indicates that even conservative saving plans do not assure that saving wealth will be enough to pay for an adequate living standard during retirement.
To better understand the meaning of our IRR estimates it is also interesting to examine the Particularly the upward trend in the dependency ratio puts "stress" on the PAYG system. The higher the dependency ratio, the more retirees' pension entitlements each actual contributor needs to finance. Ensuring a positive IRR for today's elderly may result in higher contribution rates for today's active generation and/or require higher tax-financed transfers thereby shedding doubts on the sustainability and economic attractiveness of the system for later generations. Nevertheless, only recently the German government has passed a law that nominal pension entitlements of today's pensioners will never decline, most likely resulting in higher contribution rates in the next years. Accordingly, our scenario with inter-temporally constant nominal pension entitlements may be a good benchmark for the actual IRR levels for the birth cohort 1940 to 1945.
Low inflation rates and low nominal wage growth in recent years tend to lower average IRR.
Given that inflation rates remain at a low level, future pensioner generations, ceteris paribus, are likely to realize lower nominal returns on their pension investments than the birth cohorts investigated in the present paper. If inflation rates systematically change over time, a fair profitability comparison, however, requires an IRR measurement in real terms.
The decline in fertility together with the rise of female labor supply will have implications for the IRR distribution of future pensioner cohorts. Both trends are likely to reduce the length of non-contribution periods of female insurants, and this should translate into lower IRR for future female pensioner cohorts. Accordingly, it is likely that the gender divide in IRR becomes lower in the next decades. Converging labor-force participation rates of females and males should work in the same direction.
Finally, given the political will to guarantee a minimal living standard for pensioners together with rising unemployment rates and discontinuous employment biographies, more redistribution will be required in the future. A provision of the funds via higher PAYG contributions or lower returns, ceteris paribus, puts further pressure on the returns of insurants whose pension exceeds the legal minimum. An alternative financing via taxes results in a higher tax burden for particular economic groups or for the entire economy. If the sum of total earnings is negatively affected by such a policy, pension cuts and lower IRR for future cohorts are likely.
Concluding remarks
Based on real-life employment biographies for German PAYG pension insurants retiring in year 2005, the present paper has provided the distribution of intra-cohort internal rates of return on pension contributions. Such information should be particularly useful to policy makers who want to understand the intra-cohort redistributive effects of Bismarck-type pension systems.
Under the conservative assumption that nominal future pension entitlements are frozen at year 2008 level, we find that the expected average nominal internal rate of return is slightly above three percent. Differences in life expectancy, earnings capacity, marital status and other socioeconomic characteristics, however, translate into substantial differences in IRR across insurants. Our findings suggest that the German pension system, at least within the cohort retiring in 2005, redistributes towards female insurants (due to a higher life expectancy), married insurants (due to survivor pensions), and towards insurants with children (as periods of child-care are credited in the German pension system). Moreover, it turns out that the system is intra-cohort progressive, as indicated by a negative correlation between rates of return and lifetime earnings-capacity.
Finally, some words on the limitations of our analysis. First, our IRR estimates are conditional upon reaching retirement age. Insurants deceasing earlier are not included in our calculations. The fraction of the population not reaching retirement age is about 15 percent for male and eight percent of female insurants. If no survivor pension is granted, the de-facto IRR of these insurants is minus infinity (positive investments but zero returns). Second, insurants with East German employment biographies are not included in our working sample.
Germany's pension system, however, grants pension entitlements to people with East German employment biographies. As we see no sensible way to convert Mark, the currency in the former GDR to Euro, we have excluded these insurants from the analysis. Third, the working sample exclusively consists of old-age pensioners. Accordingly, our estimates do not reflect that the system redistributes resources to recipients of a pension of limited duration paid Note. From left to right and top to bottom: insurants retiring at age 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, and 65. Data from German Federal Statistical Office (2007) . 
